UbiPAL : secure messaging and access control for ubiquitous computing by Bielstein, Cameron Taylor
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright 
by 
Cameron Taylor Bielstein 
2015  
  
The Thesis Committee for Cameron Taylor Bielstein 
Certifies that this is the approved version of the following thesis: 
 
 
UbiPAL: Secure Messaging and Access Control for Ubiquitous Computing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPROVED BY 
SUPERVISING COMMITTEE: 
 
 
 
Lorenzo Alvisi 
Robert F. Dickerson 
  
Supervisor: 
Co-Supervisor: 
  
UbiPAL: Secure Messaging and Access Control for Ubiquitous Computing 
 
 
by 
Cameron Taylor Bielstein, B.S.C.S 
 
 
Thesis 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of  
The University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of  
 
Master of Science in Computer Science 
 
 
The University of Texas at Austin 
May 2015  
  
Dedication 
 
Dedicated to my parents, Chris and Shelley, who taught me to always reach for the next challenge.
v 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to acknowledge the abundance of help and guidance from my thesis advisor, Dr. Robert 
F. Dickerson, who stepped in when I was in need of help and provided new direction to this project. 
I would also like to acknowledge the mentoring of Dr. Ahmed Gheith who taught me to believe I 
can make a positive contribution to academic research. Finally, thanks goes to Lori McNabb, 
Tiffany Buckley, and Dr. Lorenzo Alvisi for going above and beyond to provide me with this 
opportunity.  
vi 
 
Abstract 
 
UbiPAL: Secure Messaging and Access Control for Ubiquitous Computing 
 
Cameron Taylor Bielstein, MSCompSci 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2015 
 
Supervisor: Lorenzo Alvisi 
Co-Supervisor: Robert F. Dickerson 
 
The ubiquitous computing environment and modern trends in personal computing, such as 
body sensor networks and smart houses, create unique challenges in privacy and access control. 
Lack of centralized computing and the dynamic nature of human environments and access rules 
render most access control systems insufficient for this new category of systems. UbiPAL is an 
object-oriented communication framework for ubiquitous systems which provides secure 
communication and decentralized access control. UbiPAL uses a modified SecPAL 
implementation to provide reliable, ad hoc access control. The UbiPAL system uses 
cryptographically signed, publicly held namespace certificates and access control lists in the style 
of TLS certificates. This approach allows message authentication and authorization in an ad hoc, 
completely decentralized method while maintaining human readability of policy language. 
UbiPAL was implemented as a C++ library, made freely available at [1], and evaluated to have 
minimized overhead. Even on the slowest device evaluated, a Raspberry Pi, UbiPAL 
authentication and authorization adds less than 20 milliseconds to the delivery a message with a 
message overhead of 153 bytes. The UbiPAL programming model separates access policy from 
application programming and results in small amounts of code required from the application 
programmer, creating an accessible paradigm for programming ubiquitous computing systems. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent trends in computing devices are fueling a drastic change in the computing landscape. 
Developers are presented with an increasing number of cheap, low-end devices for embedded 
computing with popular examples found in devices such as the Raspberry Pi and the BeagleBone 
Black. The availability of these low-cost, physically small computing devices has given rise to the 
design of “smart” devices. These devices take their so-called intelligence from embedded 
computer systems that infuse objects typically considered outside the realm of computing with 
the advantages of network connectivity and programmable logic. The increasing complexity and 
number of these devices has presented the opportunity for the devices to network and collaborate 
to achieve user objectives in a real-world, human environment. Smarthomes, sensor networks, 
and wearable technology are three emerging categories of distributed systems. 
These new models of distributed systems bring with them a unique challenge in privacy and 
access control. Increasing ubiquity of devices means an increasing integration with the user’s 
environment and potentially increased availability of sensitive user information or control over 
user safety. By nature, some of these devices may be responsible for privacy and safety concerns 
of the users through the control of security devices such as locking doors and security cameras or 
medical devices including pacemakers and heart rate monitors. Access control and privacy in this 
context becomes increasingly challenging as a smarthome may need to differentiate homeowner 
from house guest and change behavior when a guest is present. Since ubiquitous systems are 
integrated into human environments, users may play multiple roles, perhaps simultaneously. 
Personal and professional roles carry privileges to different resources and multiple users can be 
present in a given situation with ranging levels of privileges. Furthermore, access control 
requirements in real-world scenarios may involve control of access to physical entities that may 
 2   
 
not be standard across all users. Technical challenges abound in the ubiquitous world as well. 
There are no guarantees of availability in such a real-world scenario. Systems in the network may 
have intermittent network connections, extremely low-powered processing capabilities, or may be 
physically mobile. 
Since these ubiquitous systems reside as elements of the human environment and may act at 
the request and on the behalf of human users with real world results, it is beneficial to consider 
access control from a human perspective. Human decisions of access control may be strongly 
circumstantial. Human access control decisions can be as trivial as a stranger asking for the time 
of day or a mutual friend asking for admission to your home. While the prior decision may be 
simple, the latter decision is much more nuanced. Such a decision may depend on if your mutual 
friend is present and willing to vouch for this individual, the lateness of the hour, or the presence 
of severe weather outside of your home. 
This paper seeks a digital expression of such complex, conditional access control decisions 
that is protective of user privacy and resilient against network partitions and low availability. This 
paper builds such a system through extension and modification of the SecPAL policy assertion 
language [2]. The major contributions of this paper are as follows: 
 Extension of the SecPAL language to allow for policy assertions with fully dynamic 
external conditional statements. 
 Design of a modified SecPAL system using publicly held, cryptographically signed 
namespace certificates and access control lists to remove any single point of failure, such 
as reliance on a centralized certificate authority. 
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 Implementation of a software library which embodies the above while focusing on ease 
of programmability for the application developer. The source code of this library is 
provided open and free for use by the ubiquitous computing community.  
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2. Background 
Although several successful access control solutions exist, they do not rise to the challenge of 
a dynamic, real-world environment. A few relevant examples are presented below. 
Readers may be familiar with POSIX access control lists (ACLs) [3] from their prevalent use 
in POSIX-compliant operating systems. POSIX ACLs are a textbook definition of discretionary 
access control (DAC). DAC is a method of access control in which certain users may pass access 
permission either directly or indirectly on to a third party. POSIX ACLs are implemented with the 
familiar owner, group, and others permissions for read, write, and execute. In this system, the file 
owner may allow or disallow access to specific groups but not have exclusive control over the 
membership of those groups. In this way, access permission may be delegated to users with 
permissions to administrate user groups. POSIX ACLs have seen success in single-machine 
systems, however such control lists fail to express the complex rules that are required to operate 
in a human space. They suffer from strict centralization and high administrative overhead. All 
authorization and authentication is performed by the local kernel. Such high centralization does 
not scale well to the external world. In a complex system, minor changes to desired user abilities 
may require refactoring of user groups and tedious permission changes on individual files. 
Furthermore, basic access is controlled over a predefined set of actions: read, write, and execute. 
More fine-grained levels of control, such as allowing append but not modification or write 
without deletion, would require changes of the underlying operating system in order to 
implement. Additionally, once set, an access control list is valid under all circumstances until 
manually updated again. Such a static system is not well suited to the challenges of a dynamic 
human environment. 
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More distributed approaches to access control have been attempted. Kerberos [4] is a well-
known centralized system for network authentication in a client-server format. In order for two 
clients to authenticate themselves with each other, the clients first authenticate themselves with 
the Kerberos authentication server. The authentication server challenges against the private key of 
the client and presents each client which passes the challenge with a ticket, which the clients use 
to prove their identities to each other. Although Kerberos was originally based solely on 
symmetric cryptography [4], later revisions allowed initial client authorization using asymmetric 
cryptography with public keys [5]. Although Kerberos allows for reliable authentication of 
clients, it does not access control or request authorization. The system also requires all 
participants to be registered with the system, unknown clients may not connect, and has a strong 
single point of failure. These three restrictions hold Kerberos back from being the full answer to 
the access control in the ubiquitous computing environment. 
A different direction has been proposed by Becker, Fournet, and Gordon in their research on 
SecPAL [2, 6]. SecPAL (Security Policy Assertion Language) is a DAC access control language 
which aims to decentralize the creation and administration of access control lists and the 
authorization of requested operations in distributed systems. Their research describes both an 
access control language and a system for that language. The SecPAL system describes a set of 
SecPAL policy assertions which combine to allow access to appropriate parties. These assertions 
may directly allow access to a user or class of users, classify users, or delegate the ability to make 
assertions about specific resources. 
SecPAL allows some dynamic checks 
such as temporal access constraints. 
Figure 1 shows a simple example from 
[2] with rules necessary to allow user 
Cluster says STS can say X is a  
 researcher 
Cluster says X can execute dbgrep if  
 X is a researcher 
STS says Alice is a researcher 
Figure 1: Assuming the existence of a process named 
Cluster that allows command dbgrep and a secure 
token service STS, these SecPAL assertions allow 
Alice to run dbgrep on Cluster. 
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Alice to execute command dbgrep on Cluster. These rules assert that researchers are able to run 
the application dbgrep and that Alice is a researcher, as stated by STS on the authority of Cluster. 
Therefore, Alice can execute dbgrep. This assumes the existence of a process named Cluster and 
a secure token server called STS. 
These assertions, or tokens, are held at the node which makes a given assertion and would be 
collected by Alice and sent with her request to Cluster. Cluster would evaluate the rules based on 
the union of local tokens it has created as well as the tokens sent by the request. Since Cluster is 
the resource guard, it is responsible for checking the tokens, but Alice is responsible for gathering 
and sending any tokens the resource guard does not hold. 
However, despite the advances for access control in a distributed environment, SecPAL is not 
completely appropriate for ubiquitous systems. First, SecPAL has multiple points where single-
node failure or network partitioning may block system execution. Such a weak liveness property 
is undesirable in a distributed system where node availability is not guaranteed. There are two 
major examples of single-node failure in SecPAL. The first is revealed in the necessity of a 
central external secure token authority. The SecPAL implementation discussed by Becker, 
Fournet, and Gordon is built on top of Kerberos [2]. If this token authority fails or becomes 
partitioned from parts of the network, any node which is unable to reach the Kerberos server will 
be unable to authenticate and execution will be blocked until contact with the Kerberos server 
may be regained. The second point of failure is through credential gathering [7]. Credentials are 
stored locally at each node in the SecPAL network and can be gathered through a method 
presented by Becker, Mackay, and Dillaway [7]. Becker, Mackay, and Dillaway acknowledge 
that if a node holds some of the credentials required and becomes unavailable to the network for 
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any reason, credential gathering cannot successfully gather all credentials needed to pass to the 
resource guard and will fail. 
The SecPAL language is also not fully equipped for real-world access control in that the 
language does not allow fully dynamic conditions based on real-world conditions. Although 
SecPAL does include some dynamic conditions, such as checks of file attributes and temporal 
conditions [2], external conditions are not considered part of the access control. Consider the 
previously described house guest example, it would be impossible to allow the individual into the 
house on the condition of inclement weather based purely on SecPAL security assertions. It 
would be a requirement for a user application to do this on its own, which divides static and 
dynamic access control elements between various programming elements: SecPAL and the 
application running on SecPAL. This is undesirable as it places more implementation 
responsibility on the shoulders of the application developer and increases complexity of the 
security model. Such a model would also be at increased risk of malicious applications.   
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3. UbiPAL 
This section describes the design of UbiPAL, the Ubiquitous Policy Assertion Language. 
UbiPAL is a SecPAL-based access control system designed to address the shortcomings of 
SecPAL as described above. UbiPAL, and thus this section, is divided into two parts: the UbiPAL 
system and the UbiPAL language. The UbiPAL system is a message passing system responsible 
for secure inter-process communication over a network. It includes a completely decentralized ad 
hoc SecPAL implementation based on the UbiPAL language for access control. The UbiPAL 
language is an extended version of SecPAL to support human-readable policy assertions with 
external conditions. 
3.1 UbiPAL system 
The UbiPAL system is designed as disjoint processes communicating through authenticated 
and secure network messages. The model follows the design pattern of the Mach microkernel [7] 
of modeling networked machines as objects between which messages are passed to trigger events. 
As Mach maps port numbers to processes, UbiPAL maps UbiPAL names to services. Access 
control is specified on the types of messages each service may receive from a given sender. Each 
message is defined as a message title and message arguments, much like a function call. The 
receiving service only delivers the message if the sending service successfully passes 
authentication and has the authority to send that type of message to the receiving service. 
To be completely decentralized, message passing and message authorization must happen 
without access to any specific service outside of the sender and receiver. Each service should be 
able to make its own decisions on access control and services must be able to communicate 
directly to each other without any routing service or namespace server. Failure to meet such 
requirements introduces a single point of failure to the network. The potentially mobile nature of 
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ubiquitous computing makes network partitions inevitable and failure to handle those partitions 
undesirable. To achieve these goals, UbiPAL uses a distributed namespace with ad hoc access 
control. 
3.1.1 Distributed Namespace 
The UbiPAL namespace is a flat network of services. A service is an abstraction for a node 
on the network and services need not have a one-to-one mapping to a physical machine. A single 
machine may run may services or a service may actually represent many machines. A service 
name may even represent a user. 
The services are authenticated based on an asymmetric, cryptographic public key 
infrastructure similar to the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol [8], or its predecessor the 
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol [9]. Services are uniquely identified solely by their public 
key. This idea, presented by Blaze, Feigenbaum, and Lacy in 1996 [10] and used by the Simple 
Public Key Architecture (SPKI) [11] and the SecPAL implementation from [2] removes the layer 
of indirection created through a mapping of name to public key in systems such as TLS. This 
works because a soundly generated private key generates a globally unique public key [12]. The 
authors of the SPKI Certificate Theory report for the Internet Engineering Task Force note that in 
addition to globally unique identifiers, the use of public keys for identifiers makes more sense in 
the digital world since there is a small amount of information gleaned from an arbitrary name for 
a computer, despite humans placing huge importance on names in trust-based relationship 
decisions [12]. Furthermore, this simplifies challenging the identity of a service as the name can 
be used as a public key to encrypt a challenge message or check a message signature. In this way, 
the only vital piece of information for each service is the private key. If the private key is saved to 
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a file or transferred securely between devices, the service may restart after system failure or 
migrate between devices. 
Once a process generates its public and private key pair, it creates a UbiPAL namespace 
certificate. The namespace certificate is the public key, also known as the service identifier, an 
Internet Protocol (IP) address and port number to which messages for the service should be sent, 
and a certificate version number. The version 
number is a monotonically increasing non-
negative integer used to differentiate more 
recent versions of the namespace certificate in 
the event of updates. This update mechanism promotes simple updates in the face of device 
mobility. The certificate is signed with the service’s private key. The inclusion of both the public 
key, as the service identifier, and a private key signature of the certificate creates tamper-free 
certificates and allows each certificate to be authenticated without a central certificate authority. 
Because the certificates are self-authenticating, namespace certificates may be cached at each 
service and forwarded as is to requesting services to serve as an ad hoc namespace lookup 
service. Neighboring services may be polled for a given namespace certificate until it is found. 
Once a certificate is found mapping the desired service identifier to an IP address and port, the 
services may communicate directly to each other.  
3.1.2 Ad Hoc Access Control 
SecPAL stores policy assertion credentials on each node and checks the credentials at the 
receiving service [2] and the SecPAL research group presented a method of gathering those 
credentials [7]. However, their method of abductive credential gathering [7] does not allow for a 
Service Identifier (Public key) 
Internet Protocol address 
Port number 
Version number 
Private key signature 
Figure 2: UbiPAL namespace certificate. 
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node holding required credentials to fail. The UbiPAL system solves this problem through the 
creation of publicly held access control lists. 
Each element collects access control rules 
into access control lists. They may be grouped as 
a single list or separated between multiple lists 
for fine-grained caching and forwarding by other 
services. These access control lists, layout shown 
in Figure 3, are signed with the private key of the service for verification and broadcast to 
neighbors in the network. In the same manner as namespace certificates, UbiPAL access control 
lists are self-authenticating and resistant to tampering. Therefore, these rules can be sent publicly 
or privately to neighbors in the network to preserve privacy, and non-private access control lists 
can be forwarded arbitrarily by other services in the network. Upon receipt of a message, the 
receiving service should evaluate the right of the sending service to send that message based on 
the non-revoked access control lists heard by the receiving service at the time of message receipt. 
Should the current access control lists known by the receiving service not allow the message to be 
delivered, the receiving service drops the message and notifies the sending service of the 
unauthorized status of the message. Although this service may produce false negatives, as there 
may exist an access control list allowing the message that the receiving service has yet to receive, 
it will result in no false positives, which must be avoided for secure access control. To mitigate a 
false negative, the sending service may forward any additional access control lists to help fill gaps 
in the receiving service’s access control lists and retry the message, if desired. 
 
 
Service Identifier (Public key) 
Globally unique access control  
list identifier 
Private/Public 
Number of rules (Num_Rules) 
Num_Rules times: rule 
Figure 3: UbiPAL access control list. 
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3.2 UbiPAL Language 
Due to its design, SecPAL is naturally extensible [2, 6]. For the ubiquitous computing 
context, SecPAL must be extended to control access of messages and to accept dynamic external 
conditions. The SecPAL language is simply a set of assertions about access control. Each 
assertion is comprised of an issuer, a set of conditional facts, and a constraint [2]. The UbiPAL 
language defines all access control in terms of the public key service identifier. 
SecPAL allows declaration of user-defined predicates, which UbiPAL leverages to introduce 
the “can send” predicate to describe message sending rights. The predicate has arity two and is 
the following syntax: can send [-] to [-]. This predicate describes an access control statement that 
allows the service specified by the second argument to receive the specified message. With this 
additional predicate, UbiPAL may express access in terms of messages passed between elements 
in the namespace.  
SecPAL also 
allows the addition of 
constraints without 
affecting decidability 
or tractability [2]. 
UbiPAL adds a 
“confirms” condition 
with arity two of the 
following syntax: [-] 
confirms [-]. The first 
argument is a service 
e :: = x     (variables) 
| A    (constants) 
pred ::=  can send message [-] to [-] (message control) 
D ::= non-negative integer  (re-delegation length) 
verbphrase ::= pred e
1
 … e
n
  for n = Arity(pred) 
 | can say [D] fact  (delegation) 
 | is e    (aliasing) 
 | is a e    (grouping) 
fact ::= e verbphrase 
op ::= <    (less than) 
 | >    (greater than) 
cond ::= cond e
1
 … e
n
    for n = Arity(cond) 
| [-] confirms [-]  (remote condition) 
 | CurrentTime() op e  (temporal condition - time) 
 | CurrentDate() op e  (temporal condition - date) 
 | pred 
rule ::= e says fact   (assertion) 
 | e says fact if cond
1
, …, cond
n
 (conditional assertion) 
Figure 4: UbiPAL additions to the SecPAL scheme. Bolded elements 
have been added for UbiPAL. 
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identifier and the second is a message to send. The condition will return true if the evaluating 
service has a namespace certificate for the given service identifier, the evaluating service is 
privileged to send the given message, the confirming message responds with a defined 
confirmation message and, to ensure liveness, the entire evaluation does not surpass a 
configurable timeout period. This confirmation allows UbiPAL rules to be written to adjust to 
human environmental factors as detected by remote services. Other services in the system may 
provide information through the confirms condition to allow a service to make a dynamic 
decision on access control. Since confirms messages are subject to all the rules of access control 
and are answered only with a confirmation or error message, user privacy is not compromised. 
UbiPAL also introduces simplified depth of delegation. SecPAL allows the argument D in the 
delegation verbphrase to be 0 or ∞, representing no re-delegation or unbounded re-delegation. 
The authors of SecPAL point out that chaining can say[0] N times allows N levels of delegation 
for any non-negative integer N [2]. However, this syntax quickly becomes verbose. UbiPAL 
simply defines the argument D to be any non-negative integer, creating a much cleaner syntax.  
Because UbiPAL language specifies all names as the public keys, policy rules can get quite 
long. The UbiPAL policy assertion language introduces the predicate “is” in addition to “is a.” 
“is” can be used to shorten existing statements as shown in some of the examples in Section 5.1. 
Finally, UbiPAL loosens assertion safety requirements from SecPAL. SecPAL requires any 
variable mentioned in the assertion to also be listed in the conditional facts [2]. The authors of 
SecPAL assert this safety requirement ensures completeness and termination of their evaluations, 
which are run after being translated into Datalog. Although this does not fully preclude blanket 
access control rules, it does increase the complexity as users and clients must declare themselves 
as a member of some group [2] and therefore must have a knowledge of the system. UbiPAL 
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changes the method of evaluation and needs not make such a constraint on variables, allowing 
true global access assertions.  
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4. Implementation 
The UbiPAL specification as stated above was implemented as an open source C++ library. 
The library is available for review and modification at [1]. Some important implementation 
details are discussed in this section. 
4.1 Events, Messages, and Threads 
The UbiPAL library is a multi-threaded, event-driven library. When a service is executed, it 
starts several threads for sending, receiving, and handling of messages. Upon receiving a 
message, the message receive event is triggered. This event authenticates the sender, authorizes 
the message being received, and handles the message as appropriate by type. 
Messages on the network are passed as three basic types: namespace certificates, access 
control lists, and messages. Namespace certificates and access control lists are handled by 
UbiPAL code without need for application programmer defined handlers. Most messages are 
handled by application programmer code. Some specific messages are handled by UbiPAL, such 
as requests for specific namespace certificates or access control lists.  
For received messages not handled by the UbiPAL library code, the application programmer 
must register callback functions for each message type the service will handle. Upon receiving an 
authorized, authenticated message of a type with a registered callback, the UbiPAL library calls 
that function, effectively transferring control of execution back to the application programmer 
and executing the user-defined code for that message. 
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Message authorization is performed as a bounded, breadth-first search of the tree of access 
control lists on hand. Using a tree search allows for a search of the available access control rules, 
which may be rapidly changing, in linear time. This is preferable to SecPAL authorization 
queries, which take polynomial time [2]. An authorization tree is built relative to the resource 
guard which, when a message is being received, is the receiving service. Services are the nodes in 
the authorization tree while the resource guard is the root. Links in the tree are created by 
delegation of the fact in question. The authorization process searches down the tree following the 
delegation links to the maximum depth specified by the “can say” verbphrase until either a policy 
assertion allowing the requested operation is found and the request is authorized or until the tree 
search is exhausted and the request is not authorized. Conditions are collected along the path and 
evaluated when a path successfully terminates. Lazy condition evaluation saves the overhead of 
sending unnecessary confirmation messages. 
 
Figure 5: Access Control List tree for the Bob's House example from below. Bob's door is the 
root, delegation goes through Bob to Alice, collecting the BOB_IS_HOME condition. 
Bob s Door
Bob
Alice
Other 
services
Other 
services
Condition: BOB_IS_HOME
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4.2 Message Privacy and Authentication 
Message privacy is ensured through encryption. Messages are sent between services with 
RSA [13] public keys for service identifiers. Since identifiers are RSA public keys, the identifier 
of the receiving service can be used to encrypt a message that can only be decrypted by the 
receiving service, which holds the matching private key. This guarantees the receiving service is 
the intended service, even if the address or port used actually maps to a different service as the 
other service will not be able to decrypt the message without the private key of the destination 
service. To authenticate the sender, each message is signed by the private key of the sending 
service. Since the message is sent with the sending service’s identifier, which is the public key, 
the identity of the sender and the integrity of the content can be authenticated based on message 
content alone. 
However, the UbiPAL library makes as sparing use of RSA encryption as possible. As 
discussed in the evaluation section below, RSA asymmetric encryption is much less performant 
than symmetric encryption. Therefore, UbiPAL, on first contact with a new service, exchanges 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [14] symmetric private keys to use for all future 
encryption between the two services. This dramatically reduces the overhead of encrypted 
communication. 
4.3 Message Delivery: Polling vs. Pushing 
The object-oriented nature of UbiPAL lends itself to a polling method of data acquisition. A 
service requiring data from a neighboring service simply sends a message requesting the data and 
awaits the reply. In some scenarios, discussed below in the evaluation, this is not an efficient use 
of network resources. Instead, to avoid excess network traffic, the neighboring service should be 
able to notify the requesting service when new data is available. UbiPAL accomplishes this 
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through message caching, which is this system’s take on the classic computer science tradeoff of 
polling versus pushing. Rather than writing custom message handlers, UbiPAL programmers may 
register their current response for a given message with the UbiPAL service. Remote services 
may register to receive updates on that message response and when a new response is set, each 
registered service will receive an update message. The registered service caches that updated 
response on its local machine. That message cache is checked before any outgoing message is 
sent. If there is a response in the cache for the outgoing message, the outgoing message is not sent 
and the cached response is delivered to the given handler immediately. In certain situations, 
discussed below in the evaluation, this push model can save significant amounts of network 
overhead.   
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5. Evaluation 
This section presents an evaluation of the UbiPAL language and system, as implemented in 
the UbiPAL library described above. Case studies are presented to demonstrate the ease of 
programming in the UbiPAL model and evaluation of the system’s overhead are presented to 
demonstrate the minimal performance tradeoff necessary to program inside the UbiPAL model. 
5.1 Case Studies 
Two example case studies are presented below. The first example is very straight forward and 
included primarily to aid the understanding of UbiPAL access control lists. The second scenario 
is a bit more involved and includes pseudo code and full access control lists for each service in 
the scenario. 
5.1.1 House Guest Example 
A simple example is given of an interaction in UbiPAL. The next subsection will present a 
more complex scenario. This scenario describes Alice visiting Bob’s home. Bob would like his 
door to unlock for Alice, but only if he is home. This example will use English names for service 
identifiers rather than public keys, for the sake of readability. This example assumes the 
following services and users exist alice, bob, bob_door, bob_house. The access control lists for 
each device are listed in the figures below. 
Figure 6: bob_door's access control list delegates to bob the authority to allow individuals to 
open the door. Bob is not allowed to re-delegate. 
bob can say[1] X can send OPEN to bob_door 
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Figure 7: Bob's access control list says Alice may open the door only if bob_house confirms he is 
home. 
Figure 8: bob_house's access control list restricts access to Bob’s presence information to only 
elements of the house, then defines bob_door as an element of the house. Access control on 
confirmation messages reduces the risk of leaking information. 
When Alice arrives at Bob’s house, she can send a message to the door, perhaps with a 
smartphone, to request that the door unlock for her by sending OPEN to bob_door. Since 
bob_door has delegated access control to bob, bob’s access control list comes into play, which 
gives the conditional statement that Alice may open the door if Bob is home. bob_house allows 
any member of the house_element group to check for presence in the house and specifies 
bob_door is an element of the house. This allows bob_door to confirm BOB_IS_HOME. With 
these rules, if Bob is home, Alice is allowed to unlock the door. Such a situationally aware 
alice can send OPEN to bob_door if bob_house confirms BOB_IS_HOME 
X can send BOB_IS_HOME if X is a house_element 
bob_door is a house_element 
Bob
Bob s Door
Bob s House
Alice
Confirm BOB_IS_HOME
Delegate OPEN
Send OPEN
Message Directly Allowed
Message Allowed Through 
Delegation
Message Delegation
Figure 9: Message flow and delegation in the Bob's house example. 
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scenario is not possible in SecPAL. Without the confirms conditional keyword, SecPAL would 
require moving parts of this access control logic into the application code and out of the policy 
assertions. This is also completed without the need for a central token server login before the 
interaction. Each service, upon encountering each other for the first time, would simply swap 
namespace certificates and, optionally, access control lists.  
5.1.2 Medical Heart Rate Monitoring 
This example is slightly more involved. There are more actors involved in more complex 
interactions. Dr. Alice is a general care doctor who works with heart specialist Dr. Bob. Drs. 
Alice and Bob are caring for their patient, Chris, who has a heart condition. Chris has been 
instructed to wear a heart rate monitor at all times to report information about his heart back to 
Dr. Alice in her office. If the heart rate is outside of a normal range, for this example defined to 
be below 60 beats per minute or above 120 beats per minute, Dr. Alice will page Dr. Bob with the 
information, who may then request heart rate information directly from Chris’ heart rate monitor. 
Chris will also be notified on his smartwatch when his heart rate is outside of normal bounds. 
Chris’ smartphone has an app to allow him to further share his heart rate information, which 
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includes the option to temporarily disable sharing by turning off the share heart rate setting 
through an app on his smartwatch. The desired interaction is illustrated in Figure 10 below. 
  
Figure 10: Message flow and delegation in the Chris’ heart rate monitor example. 
The access control lists for each service in this interaction are listed below. These are 
taken directly from the implementation used for testing. Note that each access control list is 
human readable and no more than a few lines in length each. Public key identifiers have been 
shortened for readability.  
CDEB… IS smartphone 
E46F… IS smartwatch 
CC89… IS hrm 
X CAN SEND MESSAGE ShareHeartRate TO Z if X IS hrm, Z IS smartwatch 
X CAN SEND MESSAGE Alert TO Z if X is smartphone, Z IS smartwatch 
CDEB… IS smartphone 
CC89… IS hrm 
X CAN SAY Y CAN SEND MESSAGE RequestHeartRate TO Z if X IS  
 smartphone, Z IS hrm 
X CAN SEND MESSAGE RequestHeartRate TO Z if X IS smartphone, Z IS hrm 
Figure 11: Access control list for Chris' heart rate monitor. 
Figure 12: Access control list for Chris' smartwatch. 
 
Chris  Heart Rate 
Monitor
Chris  Smartphone
Chris  Smartwatch
Dr. Bob
Send Alert
Message Directly Allowed
Message Allowed Through 
Delegation
Message Delegation
Dr. Alice
Send Page
Send
ShareHeartRate
All unlabeled 
arrows denote 
actions on 
RequestHeartRate
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Listed below is the pseudo code for the interaction on each service. In most cases, the 
pseudo code for each service is actually shorter than the access control list. This demonstrates the 
power of separation of functionality and access control in the UbiPAL model. It can also be seen 
that although all access to RequestHeartRate messages sent to the heart rate monitor are delegated 
by Chris’ smartphone, requests are directed to the heart rate monitor itself. The heart rate monitor 
evaluates requests based on the set of all access control lists it has cached. On the condition that 
the smartphone’s access control lists have been sent to the heart rate monitor, which is necessary 
for any RequestHeartRate message to be delivered, then Drs. Alice and Bob could continue to 
receive information from the heart rate monitor even if the smartphone disconnected from the 
network due to low battery, for example. Under message caching conditions, this scenario can 
still run even with the smartwatch failing. This shows the power of UbiPAL’s publicly held 
information. Once the relevant access control lists have been created and shared and any 
E46F… IS smartwatch 
CC89… IS hrm 
AE24… IS DrAlice 
X CAN SEND MESSAGE RequestHeartRate TO Y if X IS smartwatch, Y IS hrm 
X CAN SEND MESSAGE Alert TO Y, X IS hrm, Y IS smartwatch 
X CAN SEND MESSAGE RequestHeartRate TO Y if X IS A doctor, Y IS hrm,  
 E46F… CONFIRMS ShareHeartRate 
X IS A doctor if X IS DrAlice 
X CAN SAY[1] Y IS A doctor if X IS DrAlice 
X CAN SEND MESSAGE Alert TO Y if X IS hrm, Y IS smartwatch 
C39E… IS DrBob 
CC89… IS ChrisHrm 
X CAN SEND MESSAGE RequestHeartRate TO Y if X IS DrBob, Y IS ChrisHrm 
X IS A doctor if X IS DrBob 
AE24… IS DrAlice 
C39E… IS DrBob 
X CAN SEND MESSAGE Page TO Y if X IS DrAlice, Y IS DrBob 
Figure 15: Access control list for Chris' smartphone. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Access control list for Dr. Alice. 
Figure 13: Access control list for Dr. Bob. 
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conditional values have been cached, the only two nodes required for communication are the 
resource and the requester. All other required values can be held by those services and securely 
evaluated against for access control. 
Figure 16: Pseudo code for Chris' heart rate monitor. 
Figure 17: Pseudo code for main and message RequestHeartRate response/update handler for 
Chris' smartphone. 
Figure 18: Pseudo code for main and message Alert handler for Chris' smartwatch. 
Figure 19: Pseudo code for main and message RequestHeartRate response/update handler for 
Dr. Alice. 
 
main 
 loop forever 
  value := ReadHeartRate() 
  Set Message Reply for message RequestHeartRate to  
   value 
main 
 Register with Chris’ heart rate monitor for message  
  RequestHeartRate 
Handle reply to message RequestHeartRate 
 if message.heart_rate is not in range 60-120 
  Send message Alert to Chris’ smartwatch with heart  
   rate data 
Main 
Register callback function “Handle message Alert” for receive  
 of message Alert 
 if user sets Share Heart Rate 
  Set Message Reply for message ShareHeartRate to  
   CONFIRM 
 if user sets Do Not Share Heart Rate 
   Set Message Reply for message ShareHeartRate to DENY 
Handle message Alert 
 Display alert 
Main 
 Register with Chris’ heart rate monitor for message  
  RequestHeartRate 
Handle reply/update to message RequestHeartRate 
 Display heart rate 
 if message.heart_rate is not in range 60-120 
  Send page Alert to Dr. Bob with heart rate data 
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 All presented UbiPAL rules come directly from a sample implemented in the UbiPAL 
library [1]. Total implementation code is minimal in length. The UbiPAL C++ library requires a 
small additional setup code to restore the service from a file and read the access control lists from 
a file, for example, each of which require one line. That code is library implementation specific 
and is not listed here, though examples may be found in the UbiPAL C++ repository at [1]. 
 This same scenario implemented in unmodified SecPAL has a few undesirable results. As 
with the previous scenario, all involved services would be required to have an account with a 
known token server, implemented with a system such as Kerberos, and to use that server to 
establish new connections. This single point of failure is avoided in UbiPAL as services 
authenticate themselves and authorization is directly founded on that authentication. As 
previously discussed in this section, UbiPAL would be resilient to nodes in the chain of 
delegation failing where SecPAL would not be under its model of credential gathering [7]. 
Finally, as discussed elsewhere, SecPAL is unable to express the conditional verification of the 
watch setting share heart rate mode without incorporating access control into the application code 
at the requesting side, which is undesirable. 
 
 
Main 
Register callback function “Handle message Page” for receive  
 of message Page 
Handle message Page 
Display page 
Send message RequestHeartRate to Chris’ heart rate monitor 
Handle reply to message RequestHeartRate 
Display heart rate 
Figure 20: Pseudo code for main and message handlers for Dr. Bob. 
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5.2 Overhead 
The following performance reviews are based on the code available at [1]. The analysis will 
focus on both network and computational overhead of the UbiPAL library. Evaluation will focus 
on static evaluation of network overhead, offline testing of encryption, and an analysis of 
statistics from an implementation of an above example. This section will also include discussion 
of which steps have been taken to reduce some of the overhead of the protocol. 
5.2.1 Computational Overhead 
The most computationally complex operation in the UbiPAL library by far is encryption. To 
minimize computational overhead, UbiPAL follows the work of TLS [8] and tries to minimize 
the use of the asymmetric cryptography. UbiPAL uses RSA [13] for asymmetric cryptography. 
On first contact, RSA keys are used to exchange a symmetric key. The UbiPAL library uses the 
Figure 21: Computational Time of RSA and AES operations in milliseconds against a log scale. 
RSA key generation is excluded as it only happens once per service and cannot be optimized out. 
Each data point is average of 1000 operations. 
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AES [14] for symmetric cryptography. AES cryptographic operations are several orders of 
magnitude faster than the corresponding RSA cryptographic methods. Even with the additional  
work to generate a new AES key and IV for each remote service, there is a significant savings. 
Once AES keys are exchanged, the identity of both the sender and the receiver are authenticated 
 Ubuntu Server Raspberry Pi Beaglebone Black 
Processor AMD Phenom II X4 
810 2.61 GHz 
ARM v6 700 MHz ARM AM335x 1 
GHz Cortex-A8 
Clock Speed 2.61 GHz 700 MHz 1 GHz 
Cores 4 1 1 
Memory 6 Gigabytes 512 Megabytes 512 Megabytes 
Operating System Ubuntu 14.10 Server 
virtualized 
Debian 7.8 
(Raspbian) 
Debian 7.8 
(BeagleBone Black 
2015-03-01 image) 
Host System Windows 8.1 Pro 
using Hyper-V 
6.3.9600.17396 
(virtual machine used 
100% system 
resources, as listed 
above) 
N/A N/A 
Table 1: Systems used for evaluation. 
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as those are the only two services which share the AES key used on each message, therefore 
eliminating the need for an RSA signature to validate the sender of the message. 
 The results of these changes were evaluated by finding the average type of each operation 
across three different devices: Raspberry Pi model b, BeagleBone Black, and a high-powered 
virtualized Ubuntu Server. The specifications of the systems used for test are shown in Table 1. 
Each operation was run 1000 times on each device on 100 randomized bytes and the averaged 
values are presented in Figure 21 in milliseconds against a logarithmic scale. Since RSA key 
generation is only run once per new service created and services may be saved and resumed from 
a file, it is therefore not a significant contribution to the overhead of the standard use case of 
UbiPAL services and is excluded from the graph. 
Based on this figure, the average time for our Raspberry Pi to prepare a 100 byte message for 
sending, which includes an RSA signature and an RSA encryption, is 114.5 milliseconds. The 
same unit, on average, will take 108.5 milliseconds for the required RSA decryption and RSA 
verification that are required to receive that message. Using AES symmetric cryptography with 
the elimination of RSA signature verification, those numbers drop to a simple 0.3 milliseconds to 
send and 0.2 milliseconds to receive. This savings is multiplied over the total number of messages 
sent between two services. 
A runtime evaluation was performed on the UbiPAL library. Major functions were timed to 
find a breakdown of the relative amount of overhead. The above heart rate monitor example was 
implemented in the repository at [1]. The pseudo code was translated to C++ but the access 
control lists were used exactly as is. Approximately 100 messages were sent and received by the 
five UbiPAL services involved in the example and the test was run separately on all three test 
systems. 
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Figure 23 shows the average time of the three major UbiPAL operations: message sending, 
message receiving, and access control statement evaluation. In this case, sending messages 
includes namespace certificates and access control lists, both of which always require an RSA 
signature, thus resulting in longer send times. These numbers are the average values over 91, 93, 
and 80 operations respectively and give insight into the exact computational overhead of the 
UbiPAL system. Figure 22 shows a comparison of sending a UbiPAL message compared to the 
time required to open a TCP connection and send the data without any UbiPAL operations. This 
figure uses only message sends and excludes namespace certificates and access control lists and 
operations were run 80 and 91 times, respectively. The send message operation includes message 
serialization, message encryption, and any necessary signature before opening a TCP connection 
and sending bytes. The number for TCP unicast times only the opening of the TCP connection 
and sending of bytes. Although the additional operations added by UbiPAL cause an increased 
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Figure 22: Comparison of UbiPAL's send message function and standard TCP Unicast in 
milliseconds. Each data point is the average of 80 and 91 operations for SendMessage and 
TCP Unicast, respectively. 
 
 30   
 
overhead of one order of magnitude, even the slowest device in our test array could still send 50 
secure, authenticated, and authorized messages per second. 
5.2.2 Network Overhead 
In a distributed system, network overhead can be important. As the number of services and 
messages increase, network throughput can suffer. The overhead is computed statically here, then 
at runtime in an example below. 
As discussed above, there are three message types: namespace certificates, access control 
lists, and messages between services. Namespace certificates and access control lists carry no 
user data. Assuming an RSA public modulus length of 1024 bits, or 128 bytes, the respective 
sizes of the two types of messages are shown in Figure 24 and Figure 25. Assuming a standard 
address length of 15 (address formatted as a string XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX) and a port of 5 digits, 
the namespace certificate totals to 566 bytes. Assuming four rules of 50 characters each, the 
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Figure 23: Comparison of UbiPAL send, receive, and evaluate ACL statement in milliseconds. 
Each data point is the average of over 91, 93, and 80 for send, receive, and evaluate 
statement, respectively. 
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access control list sums to 755 bytes. These values are pure overhead as they carry no actual 
application data. However, they are a set cost and once a service has received the necessary 
access control lists and namespace certificates, it needs not receive them again. Furthermore, 
networks need not be a clique, meaning services need not communicate these messages with all 
other services in a network. 
Message overhead is shown in Figure 26. The overhead of the message is the combination of 
the header and the signature. Together, the overhead of a message is 407 bytes, excluding only 
the raw bytes of the message and argument. Although this overhead is set regardless of the 
message content, there are certain steps that can be taken to reduce the number of bytes sent as 
overhead. Explicitly stating the identifier of the receiving service is only necessary during the 
handshake and exchange of AES keys or in unencrypted unicast messages. This allows the 
receiving service to verify it is indeed the destination of the message. Once regular AES 
encrypted communication commences, the full identifier is unnecessary as the receiving service 
must be the intended recipient in order to decrypt the message. The current UbiPAL library 
implementation truncates to just the first five characters of the identifier as a known value to 
enable detection of encryption in messages as well as a method to double check the intended 
recipient. Additionally, the signature, the primary function of which is to authenticate the sender, 
is unnecessary after AES keys have been exchanged as the sender’s identity is confirmed by use 
of the AES encryption alone, assuming the AES key and IV has stayed secure. This reduces the 
message overhead to 153 bytes, which is only 37.6% of the original network overhead. 
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Figure 24: Network byte layout of a UbiPAL namespace certificate. 
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Figure 25: Network byte layout of a UbiPAL access control list. 
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Figure 26: Network byte layout of a UbiPAL message. 
However, the simplest way to reduce message overhead is to avoid sending messages 
altogether. This is done in a few simple ways: message response caching and registration, and 
access control list and namespace control list requests. 
Message response caching, or message registration, is a polling versus interrupt tradeoff. The 
specific model of UbiPAL message registration is discussed in section 4.3. This is useful in a 
scenario when a service is requesting data at a higher rate than the data on a remote service is 
changing. In this case, registering for updates and caching the responses allows the requesting 
service to store the response message locally and simply deliver the response from the local 
cache, thus avoiding network requests. The remote service now has the responsibility to send an 
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update message when its reply message would change, generally when the data it is sharing 
changes. The tradeoff between polling and pushing can be seen by the following pair of 
equations: 
Equation 1  𝑀𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 2 ∗ 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑙 ∗ 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 
Equation 2  𝑀𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑢𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑 𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 = 2 + (𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 ∗ 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠) 
Equation 1 gives the number of messages over time when polling. Polling requires two 
messages, a message requesting data and its response, multiplied by the frequency of those 
messages and the span of time being considered. Polling once a second for 10 seconds produces 
20 messages. In contrast, the number of messages with pushed updates when registered for a 
message is described in Equation 2. Two messages are exchanged to register and cache the 
current reply, then a message is sent on every update of the data source for the time span 
considered. With an update frequency of every second for 10 seconds, 12 messages are sent. This 
shows a gain of about 50% to utilize registration rather than standard polling, even when the 
frequency of updates and the frequency of polling would be the same. Larger gains are received 
when the update frequency is lower than the polling frequency. As can be seen through simple 
algebra, network overhead is smaller if the polling frequency is less than half the frequency 
update time, although data may not be current at all times at the polling service. 
Similar computations can be run on the service discovery procedures. One of two methods 
can be used in a system running UbiPAL, both of which are provided in the C++ UbiPAL library: 
announce and request. Announcing requires services to broadcast namespace certificates and 
access control lists on a set interval. Any services hoping to discover other services around them 
simply wait until the next interval and receive namespace certificates or access control lists that 
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are sent. Alternatively, a service wishing to discover neighboring services may broadcast requests 
for either namespace certificates or access control lists from specific services. The UbiPAL 
library handles replying with namespace certificates or the appropriate non-private access control 
lists without the application programmer having to define message handlers. Using the request 
discovery style can save the number of announcement messages which grows linearly with the 
number of services in the network multiplied by the time span considered.  
 35   
 
6. Future Work 
Desired future work for UbiPAL includes expansion of mobile platforms supported. 
Currently, UbiPAL has been implemented as a C++ library for development and evaluation. We 
believe the mobile and ubiquitous communities stand to gain from the simple access control and 
communication model presented by UbiPAL. This would be supported by implementation of 
UbiPAL for various mobile platforms, such as the Android operating system. Other possible 
platforms may be considered in the future, although the ability to link to existing C++ libraries 
from many languages allows high reuse of the existing library code with expansion to new device 
families. 
Further work may also be consider on running UbiPAL on extremely low-powered devices 
such as sensor networks and wearable technology. Although we envision on a small scale the 
ability to use gateway devices to run UbiPAL on behalf of devices which cannot do so 
themselves, in a model similar to the home address gateway presented in Mobile IP [15], this 
does not allow easy scalability to larger networks such as environmental sensor networks. Some 
approaches utilized in 6LoWPAN [16]  or TinyPK [17] may be useful for approaching such 
resource-constrained devices. 
Additional plans also include full-system namespace lookup techniques or access control list 
gathering. This would be useful in a scenario when services are separated by subnetworks or 
unavailability yet have network traffic to exchange. Currently, an extended lookup process is left 
to the devices of the application programmer, but such discovery techniques may be beneficial to 
the UbiPAL model. Due to the ad hoc nature of UbiPAL systems, lookup techniques could be 
similar to mesh networking techniques described in papers such as [18], [19], [20]. 
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Finally, we believe it would be interesting to create visual tools for editing and debugging 
UbiPAL access control lists. Although individual statements are human-readable, reasoning about 
an entire distributed system can be difficult. A service which could graph the access control tree 
as discussed above and show the groups of devices on a network which would be granted or 
disallowed access through a given policy change could be an extremely valuable tool during 
policy creation on complex UbiPAL systems.  
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7. Related Works 
The access control language of this work is derivative of SecPAL [2], a project from 
Microsoft Research involving many researchers with publications spanning from 2006 to 2014. 
SecPAL has been discussed at length in this paper. All referenced SecPAL papers as well as 
sample projects and other related content can be found at Microsoft Research’s SecPAL page at 
[21]. Similar work to SecPAL and UbiPAL can be found in work by Blaze, Feigenbaum, and 
Lacy [10]. Their research describes a system in which specific nodes in the system hold given 
authorities. Any node wishing to act against some resource must collect the signature of a node 
with the authority over that resource and presents the collection of signatures to the resource 
guard, which is local to the resource. All names in their system are simply the node’s public key, 
removing a layer of indirection by directly mapping public keys to access control authority. 
SecPAL and UbiPAL borrow the ideas of localized resource guards and using public keys for 
names but differ in the application of access control as gathering tokens versus distributing lists. 
The UbiPAL system is related to many existing systems. Object-orientation and 
communication based on network messages, two concepts relied upon heavily by the UbiPAL 
system, have been used for decades by projects such as the Mach microkernel [22]. Mach is 
introduced as an object-oriented system allowing programmers to reason about processes as 
objects communicating through messages, much like modern day object-oriented languages. 
UbiPAL system also holds some similarities to the Plan B system [23]. Plan B is a ubiquitous 
system based on Bell Lab’s Plan 9 [24] in which all system resources are exported to the network 
and combined to form a system including the remove resources. The public key infrastructure 
mirrors some traits of TLS/SSL [8, 9] as well as parts of the Kerberos authentication service [4]. 
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We believe UbiPAL would benefit from some of the capabilities described in other systems. 
Systems such as instant matchmaking [25] encourage the ability to discover devices immediately 
around the user that perform certain tasks. A full realization of this may be along the lines of the 
personal server [26] in which a user carries a small device for computation which utilizes the 
devices around it. We believe UbiPAL could be a natural fit for such works. 
Similar protocols include DCAC [27], which is a recent system that approaches access 
control on a system in a distributed manner. Each resource has a principle user, who may delegate 
access to that resource. Principle names are assigned in a hierarchical manner and stored in files 
on the system in a consistent way that allows any machine mounting that file system to apply the 
DCAC access control policies in a consistent way. Some work in trust negotiation has followed 
similar patterns as the UbiPAL system. The authors of [28] describe a system in which devices 
exchange access control policies and identifying certificates upon a request being made between 
agents in the system. Credentials are based on the identifying certificates and allow the two 
agents to agree upon access control policies through mutual negotiation techniques. 
There is existing work on making asymmetric cryptography and public key architecture more 
accessible to the extreme low end of computing devices, such as those often found in sensor 
networks. This work could be extremely beneficial to any effort to run UbiPAL directly on a 
sensor network. Work by Watro et al. on TinyPK [17] and Malan et al. [29] are two examples of 
such work to reduce the overhead of such expensive cryptographic techniques. There is also 
ongoing work, such as [16], to decrease the overhead of protocols like the Internet Protocol 
Version 6 [30] to better serve devices with very constrained resources. 
Ubiquitous computing can be a very personal computing experience. Devices often may 
reflect activities users take in the privacy of their own home. According to research by 
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Srinivasan, Stankovic, and Whitehouse [31], snooping attacks need not even be able to read 
messages in order to learn about the users’ activities inside of a home noticing that correlations 
between network traffic and specific events can be built relatively easily. Srinivasan et al. present 
potential methods to avoid such snooping attacks from gaining personal knowledge user.  
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8. Conclusion 
The UbiPAL system successfully completely decentralizes the SecPAL system and allows for 
authentication and authorization in ad hoc networks of services while protecting against a single 
point of failure. Combined the with UbiPAL language, defined as extensions of the SecPAL 
language, the UbiPAL system successfully contextualizes SecPAL and provides an appropriate 
model for the ubiquitous computing world. The majority of complexity is handled by the 
implemented library and application programmers must simply write message event handlers and 
human readable access control policies. The overhead of delivering messages and enforcing 
access control is kept to a minimum through sparing use of asymmetric cryptography and 
reduction in UbiPAL header overhead between familiar services. Even on the slowest devices 
tested, message sending in UbiPAL shows a computational overhead of under 20 milliseconds 
with 153 bytes of message network overhead. In exchange for this overhead, UbiPAL provides a 
simple programming model for access control and secure communication through ad hoc 
authentication and authorization.  
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